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THE VIRTUE OF VAGUENESS: 
A DEFENSE OF SOUTH DAKOTA V. DOLE 
REEVE T. BULL 
INTRODUCTION 
With the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist on September 
3, 2005,1 the inevitable scholarly speculation upon the primary legacy 
of the Rehnquist Court began in earnest. Undoubtedly, scholars will 
reflect upon the federalist resurgence that occurred during 
Rehnquist’s term on the Court and particularly during his tenure as 
Chief Justice. Consternation over the decisions of the Court often 
reached a fever pitch following the issuance of important opinions 
bolstering states’ rights.2 A deeper examination of the Rehnquist 
Court, however, reveals a legacy that may be troubling to federalists. 
Though Rehnquist famously pared federal Commerce Clause 
authority in United States v. Lopez3 and United States v. Morrison,4 he 
left Congress with virtually unbounded authority under the Spending 
Clause in South Dakota v. Dole.5 Hence, states’ rights advocates are 
understandably concerned that Dole may provide Congress with an 
alternative route to achieve effectively unlimited regulatory power at 
the expense of the states. As a result, numerous federalist scholars 
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 1. Charles Lane, Chief Justice Dies at Age 80, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at A1. 
 2. See Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 643–44 
(1996) (chronicling the exaggerated reaction of certain news reporters and scholars to the Lopez 
decision). 
 3. See 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (declaring the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause authority). 
 4. See 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (declaring the Violence Against Women Act 
unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s Commerce Clause authority). 
 5. See 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (upholding Congress’s conditioning receipt of 5 percent of 
federal highway funds upon states agreeing to raise the minimum drinking age to twenty-one). 
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and politicians have proposed multifarious limits upon Congress’s 
spending power. 
This Note examines the implications of the Court’s Dole 
decision, focusing extensively on whether Dole gives Congress a 
“back door” to evade the principles of federalism championed by the 
Rehnquist Court in Lopez and Morrison. This Note ultimately 
concludes, however, that Dole is not such a “back door” and provides 
as much protection for states’ rights as is necessary and desirable in 
an inherently nebulous area of constitutional jurisprudence. Part I 
discusses the importance of the spending power by chronicling the 
recent rise of federalist principles that resulted in a significant 
retrenchment in Congress’s Commerce Clause power in Lopez and 
examining the historical evolution of extreme deference in reviewing 
national legislation passed under the Spending Clause. Subsequently, 
Part II examines the decision in South Dakota v. Dole in detail and 
concludes that its four explicitly articulated limitations on the 
spending power are largely rhetorical and place no limit on 
congressional authority that meaningfully preserves the rights of the 
states. Part III analyzes the prohibition against “coercion” of states 
noted only in passing in Dole6 and concludes that it provides the most 
promising limitation of federal Spending Clause authority. Though 
perhaps unsatisfyingly vague, the prohibition against coercion serves 
as an adequate warning against attempts by Congress to wield 
unbounded authority under the Spending Clause. This warning 
proves to be superior to any proposed bright-line standard in that 
more definitive limits on Spending Clause power are likely to fail, 
given the inherent ambiguity of the Spending Clause itself. Finally, 
Part IV marshals empirical support for the contention that the 
absence of coercion requirement of Dole and earlier cases, coupled 
with the inherent protections of the political process, has effectively 
influenced Congress to exercise less than its maximal theoretical 
powers under the Spending Clause, and has provided a meaningful—
if admittedly unclear—federalism-based limit upon Congress’s 
spending power. 
 
 6. See id. at 211 (recognizing that coercive conditions may be unconstitutional but holding 
that conditioning 5 percent of highway funds upon raising the minimum drinking age does not 
rise to the level of coercion). 
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I.  THE INCREASING RELEVANCE OF THE SPENDING CLAUSE 
A. The Decline of the Commerce Clause 
Historically, Congress passed the vast majority of its regulatory 
legislation under the Commerce Clause and relied only occasionally 
upon the Spending Clause as a source of constitutional authority.7 For 
roughly sixty years, the Supreme Court gave virtually complete 
deference to Congress in its efforts to promulgate legislation under 
the Commerce Clause based upon purported “substantial economic 
effect[s] on interstate commerce.”8 In 1995, however, the Rehnquist 
Court’s decision in Lopez repudiated this legacy by holding that 
Congress did not have the power under the Commerce Clause to 
enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act, an act criminalizing the 
possession of guns within school zones.9 According to the Lopez 
majority, upholding the Act “would bid fair to convert congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of 
the sort retained by the States.”10 Scholars have debated the 
importance of Lopez and the likelihood that it might spark a 
resurgence of the federalist values of the pre-New Deal era, but few 
dispute that Lopez marked a radical departure from what was 
virtually judicial abdication in policing limits upon Commerce Clause 
power that characterized the era from 1937 to its issuance.11 
Consequently, Lopez justifiably resulted in significant 
consternation amongst those who support a strong centralized 
government with the ability to regulate in areas in which the states 
are otherwise incapable of wielding or unwilling to exert sufficient 
 
 7. See Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 1103, 1112–13 (1987) (explaining an apparent dearth of interest in the Spending Clause 
by the traditionally extensive authority available to Congress under the Commerce Clause). 
 8. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). 
 9. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995). 
 10. Id. at 567. 
 11. Compare Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1911, 1914 (1995) (contending that Lopez represents a declaration of the Court’s intention 
to police against excessive expansion of federal power vis-à-vis the states), with Nagel, supra 
note 2, at 654 (suggesting that Lopez merely comprises the fulfillment of the Court’s repeated 
assertions in prior Commerce Clause cases that federal power cannot be expanded excessively 
and some continued role for the states must exist). 
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control.12 Further, their concerns were heightened given that most 
federal civil rights legislation is promulgated under the Commerce 
Clause13 and that such laws may not prove sufficiently commerce 
related to pass a stringent application of the Lopez test. 
In response to the apparent resurgence of federalist principles in 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts,14 advocates of a strong centralized 
government partly shifted their attention to the Spending Clause as 
an alternative means of constitutional authority to enact laws that 
might not meet the Commerce Clause standard under Lopez.15 
Literally days after the Lopez decision, President Bill Clinton 
advocated the passage of a law equivalent to the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act under the Spending Clause.16 Indeed, now that the Court 
has at least partially narrowed the “front door” of Commerce Clause 
authority, scholars’ and legislators’ interest in the “back door” of 
Spending Clause authority has increased considerably.17 
B. The Rise of the Spending Clause 
Constitutional authority for Congress to appropriate and spend 
funds arises from two sources: the implied power to tax and spend 
based on a combination of the Necessary and Proper Clause18 and 
 
 12. See Nagel, supra note 2, at 643 (chronicling the responses to Lopez in the popular press 
and noting the fear that Lopez constituted the initial step in repudiating much of the legislation 
of the Civil Rights and New Deal eras). 
 13. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (upholding applicability of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a restaurant that purchased significant quantities of food that had 
traveled in channels of interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (upholding applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a motel that 
served numerous interstate travelers). 
 14. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992) (holding that 
Congress may not commandeer state governments in forcing them to enact regulations but 
rather must regulate directly or proffer states incentives for compliance under the Spending 
Clause); Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851–52 (1976) (holding that Congress 
exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to hiring 
practices of states qua states), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 
U.S. 528 (1985). 
 15. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1913 (noting President Clinton’s efforts to pass legislation 
similar to the Gun-Free School Zones Act under the Spending Clause). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1131 (“If the front door of the commerce power is open, 
it may not be worth worrying whether to keep the back door of the spending power tightly 
closed.”). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
07__BULL.DOC 11/14/2006  8:41 AM 
2006] SPENDING CLAUSE 283 
various constitutional grants of federal legislative power19 and of the 
explicit allocation of the “power to lay and collect taxes, duties, 
imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common 
defense and general welfare of the United States.”20 Early in 
America’s history, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison debated 
the significance of the latter source of power,21 commonly known as 
the “Spending Clause.” Whereas Madison contended that the clause 
merely reiterated the ability to appropriate and spend funds under 
the other affirmative constitutional grants of legislative power, 
Hamilton argued that the ability to provide for the “general welfare” 
included the ability to tax and spend for national purposes beyond the 
power implied by the Necessary and Proper Clause.22 The Supreme 
Court eventually explicitly adopted the Hamiltonian position,23 
though the Court initially severely limited Congress’s spending power 
in areas of authority reserved for the states through the Tenth 
Amendment.24 Tenth Amendment jurisprudence atrophied with 
time,25 however, and the Court ultimately acquiesced to the right of 
Congress to use the Spending Clause to encroach into areas 
traditionally within the ambit of state power. 
In 1937, the Supreme Court retreated from the Tenth 
Amendment limitations on the Spending Clause and allowed 
Congress to regulate in areas traditionally handled by state 
governments, so long as Congress tied compliance with the 
 
 19. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1118. For instance, the ability to provide for national 
defense through raising an army and navy would necessarily involve the ability to tax and spend 
for the upkeep of such organizations. Id. at 1118–19. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 21. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 66. 
 24. Id. at 68 (“It is an established principle [of the Tenth Amendment] that the attainment 
of a prohibited end may not be accomplished under the pretext of the exertion of powers which 
are granted.”). 
 25. Indeed, Garcia effectively rendered the Tenth Amendment a mere truism, a reassertion 
of the unexceptional fact that separate spheres for state and federal regulation must exist. See 
469 U.S. 528, 560 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]oday’s decision effectively reduces the 
Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause.”). In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court did not challenge such a 
contention, id. at 160, but rather noted that commandeering of state legislative machinery is 
beyond congressional power, id. at 176, whether foreclosed by the Tenth Amendment or simply 
disallowed under the Commerce Clause. 
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regulations to the receipt of federal funds.26 Inasmuch as states could 
simply decline the receipt of federal funds, they possessed a 
legitimate choice of whether or not to adopt the regulations 
contemplated by the conditions placed on those funds, and therefore 
did not suffer any diminution of their authority.27 The state could 
“adopt[] the ‘simple expedient’ of not yielding to what she urges is 
federal coercion” by rejecting the funds.28 Of course, past penalties for 
noncompliance have been relatively minimal.29 If Congress were to 
impose a more extensive penalty on a state for noncompliance, the 
state’s ostensible “free choice” could devolve into a mere token 
gesture of acquiescing to federal coercion rather than facing 
unacceptable repercussions for defying Congress.30 
II.  TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON SPENDING 
CLAUSE AUTHORITY 
Part I.B suggested the virtually unlimited extent of federal 
Spending Clause power prior to South Dakota v. Dole. Dole, unlike 
the aforementioned cases, explicitly attempts to define the precise 
dimensions of the power and the limits thereon.31 Yet its relatively 
terse explanation of these limitations has spawned extensive 
speculation as to their extent, particularly in light of the recent 
contraction of Commerce Clause authority under Lopez.32 It is 
unclear whether Dole offers meaningful affirmative limitations upon 
the scope of Spending Clause authority. Indeed, its four explicit 
limitations appear to be rhetorical flourishes and effectively give 
complete deference to Congress in placing conditions upon federal 
funds. 
 
 26. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937) (upholding various provisions 
of the Social Security Act that created a strong incentive for states to establish their own 
unemployment compensation laws). 
 27. Id. at 596. 
 28. Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1947). 
 29. See, e.g., id. at 133 (noting that if a member of the State Highway Commission of 
Oklahoma was not removed pursuant to the Hatch Act’s limitations on state agents in political 
campaigns, the state of Oklahoma would lose the equivalent of two years of the state agent’s 
salary). 
 30. For a more thorough examination of this possibility, see infra Part III.B. 
 31. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (enumerating the various 
limits on the Spending Clause power). 
 32. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1929 (noting that, though Dole acknowledged that 
Spending Clause authority is subject to certain limits, none of the articulated limits is 
particularly effective in defining the extent of Spending Clause power). 
07__BULL.DOC 11/14/2006  8:41 AM 
2006] SPENDING CLAUSE 285 
A. Limiting the Spending Power under South Dakota v. Dole 
In Dole, the Court considered the constitutionality of a federal 
statute that conditioned the receipt of 5 percent of federal highway 
funds upon the states’ raising the minimum drinking age to twenty-
one.33 The statute thereby attempted to indirectly effect a nationwide 
change in the age at which citizens could legally imbibe alcohol, a 
type of regulation typically relegated to the “police powers” of the 
states. First, Dole cursorily noted that Congress may spend only for 
the general welfare.34 It then largely eviscerated this potential 
limitation by asserting that “courts should defer substantially to the 
judgment of Congress” as to what constitutes the general welfare.35 
Second, Dole asserted that the conditions placed upon the receipt of 
federal funds must be communicated clearly and unambiguously to 
states such that they may form a fully informed, autonomous decision 
of whether or not to accept the funds and their associated 
conditions.36 Third, Dole required a discernible relationship between 
the conditions placed on the funds and the legitimate federal aims 
sought to be achieved.37 Dole failed, however, to specify how close the 
relationship between the ends and means must be, or the amount of 
over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness that the judiciary would 
tolerate.38 Fourth, Dole cautioned that Congress could not indirectly 
violate separate constitutional limitations upon legislative authority 
by conditioning federal funds upon the states’ superseding those 
limitations.39 The fourth limitation, however, allows Congress to 
accomplish indirectly what it cannot accomplish directly because of 
Lopez. For instance, Congress could legitimately promulgate 
legislation lacking Commerce Clause support under the Spending 
Clause; Congress could not, however, violate an express limitation of 
the Constitution, such as by conditioning receipt of federal prison 
 
 33. 483 U.S. at 211. 
 34. Id. at 207. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 207–08. 
 38. See id. at 207 (failing to specify extent of acceptable over- and under-inclusiveness). 
 39. Id. at 208. 
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funds upon states’ agreeing to inflict cruel and unusual punishment 
upon state prisoners.40 
 Finally, Dole noted in passing that conditions placed upon 
funds may become sufficiently coercive that otherwise permissible 
exertion of pressure may evolve into compulsion and render the 
attempted persuasion unconstitutional.41 Interestingly, Dole did not 
explicitly enumerate the “coercion” limitation amongst the four 
aforementioned direct limitations upon spending power, yet the 
“coercion” limitation provides the most promising potential check 
upon Congress’s ability to completely usurp traditional state 
authority.42 
Justice O’Connor authored a powerful dissent in Dole discussing 
the third requirement of relatedness.43 Her objections on the basis of 
relatedness, however, may more meaningfully be construed as 
objections to the coerciveness of the statute.44  
B. The “General Welfare” Requirement 
Dole implied without explicitly holding that the first 
requirement, or the “general welfare” requirement, is merely pro 
forma and does not constitute a judicially enforceable check upon 
Congress’s regulatory power.45 In any event, present case law suggests 
that the “general welfare” requirement at best constitutes little more 
than a rhetorical assertion that spending must promote the welfare of 
the nation as a whole.46 Promotion of national ends does not imply, 
however, that Congress may never regulate in areas traditionally 
within the ambit of state authority.47 Indeed, Dole explicitly permitted 
 
 40. See id. at 210–11 (“These cases establish that the ‘independent constitutional bar’ 
limitation on the spending power is not, as petitioner suggests, a prohibition on the indirect 
achievement of objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly.”). 
 41. Id. at 211–12 (noting that the conditioning of 5 percent of federal highway funds upon 
elevating the minimum drinking age to twenty-one fails to rise to the level of compulsion). 
 42. See infra Part III.  
 43. Id. at 212 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 44. For a more thorough discussion of this point, see infra Part III.D.  
 45. See id. at 207 n.2 (“The level of deference to the congressional decision is such that the 
Court has more recently questioned whether ‘general welfare’ is a judicially enforceable 
restriction at all.”). 
 46. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936) (“[T]he powers of taxation and 
appropriation extend only to matters of national, as distinguished from local, welfare.”). 
 47. See id. at 68 (distinguishing the issue of whether “general welfare” encompasses 
regulation of agriculture, which the Court does not decide, and considering the issue of whether 
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conditioning funds upon regulation of the drinking age, a power 
traditionally left to the states. Dole did so in light of the fact that 
purely local actions, such as minors’ drinking in South Dakota, may 
result in interstate effects, such as inebriated drivers on North Dakota 
roads.48 Given the virtually limitless potential for “intrastate” activity 
to result in “interstate” effects, states’ rights advocates are unlikely to 
derive much firepower with which to challenge Spending Clause 
legislation from this limitation. 
C. The “Unambiguous Expression” Requirement 
The second limitation upon Spending Clause authority, that 
Congress must unambiguously convey its intention to condition 
receipt of funds so that states may exercise a fully informed and 
autonomous choice in accepting or rejecting funding,49 is, by nature, 
wholly rhetorical. The limitation merely requires that Congress 
clearly express its intentions. For instance, in Pennhurst State School 
& Hospital v. Halderman,50 the Court struck down a “bill of rights” 
provision, partly enacted under the Spending Clause, because in 
passing it Congress failed to convey its intention to impose conditions 
on the receipt of federal funds.51 Of course, the Court’s reasoning 
partly rested upon the assumption that Congress would not impose 
the substantial costs of complying with the “bill of rights” provision 
without providing “substantial contribution[s] to defray costs.”52 
Assuming that Congress were explicitly to condition receipt of funds 
upon compliance with the “bill of rights” provision, however, the 
state’s remaining objections would relate to the “coerciveness” of the 
legislation rather than its ambiguity. Consequently, Congress may 
express even unconstitutional conditions unambiguously and satisfy 
the second Dole limitation. 
 
regulation of agriculture violates the Tenth Amendment by intruding on traditional state 
authority). 
 48. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 (concluding that the conditioning of funds satisfied the 
relatedness requirement since drinking in one state can diminish overall highway safety in 
multiple states). 
 49. Id. at 207. 
 50. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 51. See id. at 17 (“[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal 
moneys, it must do so unambiguously.”). 
 52. See id. at 24 (“The fact that Congress granted to Pennsylvania only $1.6 million in 1976, 
a sum woefully inadequate to meet the enormous financial burden of providing ‘appropriate’ 
treatment in the ‘least restrictive’ setting, confirms that Congress must have had a limited 
purpose in enacting [the ‘bill of rights’ provision].”). 
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D. The “Relatedness” Requirement 
Of the four explicitly articulated Spending Clause limitations in 
Dole, the relatedness requirement carries the greatest potential to 
limit the inordinate expansion of congressional authority. On closer 
inspection, however, the provision proves merely to impose an 
additional rhetorical limitation upon Congress: It must name and 
allocate funds in such a manner that a challenging party cannot 
demonstrate that the conditions are unrelated to congressional goals. 
Dole further illustrated that the courts will likely render an 
exceedingly high degree of deference to Congress in its findings of 
relatedness.53 
In her dissent, Justice O’Connor legitimately objected to the 
broadness of the majority’s interpretation of the relatedness 
requirement, noting that such a test would permit Congress to 
regulate anything tangentially related to federal highways.54 For 
instance, if Congress determined that the location of a state’s capital 
unduly burdened interstate travel by elevating levels of traffic, it 
could arguably condition receipt of a percentage of federal highway 
funds upon relocation of the capital.55 
However, Justice O’Connor appeared to have realized the 
difficulty of crafting an alternative relatedness requirement that 
would more meaningfully limit federal power. Her proposed 
limitation on the federal ability to condition funds more closely 
addressed the issue of coerciveness of federal conditions, as opposed 
to the relatedness of the conditions. Specifically, O’Connor proposed 
a distinction between conditions—which could legitimately be placed 
upon the manner in which a class of funds could be spent—and 
regulations—which went beyond the manner of permissible 
disposition of funds and impermissibly intruded into a state’s sphere 
 
 53. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09 (concluding that the drinking age condition explicitly 
serves one of the primary purposes of federal highway spending, the promotion of safety). Of 
course, the majority also asserted that the state of South Dakota did not object to the finding of 
relatedness between the condition and the federal aims, id. at 208, perhaps suggesting that the 
Court would more closely scrutinize the germaneness of the condition upon the existence of an 
appropriately pled objection. Nonetheless, the majority’s express statement that “the condition 
imposed by Congress is directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway funds 
are expended—safe interstate travel,” id., suggests that it considered the qualifications for 
relatedness met. 
 54. Id. at 215 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. 
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of authority.56 Congress could, however, facilely circumvent the test 
simply by reclassifying and renaming the funds it provides. For 
instance, Congress could easily accomplish its aims of regulating 
highway safety simply by dedicating a certain percentage of highway 
funds to prevention of alcohol consumption by minors. Such a system 
would preclude Congress from abusing its regulatory power by 
withholding from states a far greater percentage of highway funds 
than would be required to prevent alcohol abuse by minors, but 
would allow Congress to achieve any desired aim promoting the 
“general welfare” simply by appropriately naming the allocated 
funds.57 Hence, though Justice O’Connor reasonably objected to the 
apparent lack of anything more than an attenuated relationship 
between federal highways and underage drinking, her proposed 
solution more adequately addressed the dilemma of coercive 
conditions and thereby implicitly recognized the exceeding difficulty 
of formulating any coherent limitation based upon relatedness of 
conditions and federal ends.58 
 
 56. Of course, Justice O’Connor’s dissent is equally susceptible to the interpretation that 
“conditions” devolve into impermissible “regulations” when they are tenuously related to 
federal aims (rather than when they are overly coercive). However, O’Connor derives her test 
from the Butler decision, id. at 216, a case that explicitly distinguishes between unconstitutional 
regulations and mere conditions upon how money will be spent, United States v. Butler, 297 
U.S. 1, 73 (1936). That case nowhere mentions any requirement of “relatedness.” But cf. Baker, 
supra note 11, at 1961–62 (arguing that O’Connor imposed a “relatedness” requirement but 
failed to reconcile existing case law in neither proffering a definition for “condition” nor 
clarifying how withholding two years of pay, at issue in Oklahoma, constitutes a proper 
“condition” whereas withholding 5 percent of highway funds does not). 
 57. For instance, rather than simply allocating to states a bloc of funds designated as 
“highway funds,” Congress could parse the funds into various portions reflecting the aims it 
sought to achieve, such as “highway safety funds,” “highway maintenance funds,” “highway 
traffic reduction funds,” etc. 
 58. Indeed, O’Connor’s “parade of horribles” concerning the ability of Congress to 
regulate the states in otherwise unacceptable ways, such as in conditioning federal highway 
funds upon relocation of the state capital, Dole, 483 U.S. at 215, would also seem to fail her 
articulated test if construed as an interdiction against coercion. For example, under O’Connor’s 
test, a requirement of moving the state capital, an obviously coercive imposition upon state 
authority, would comprise an impermissible regulation rather than a condition insofar as the 
costs of relocating the capital far exceed any savings in reduced highway traffic. See id. at 216 
(“[T]here is an obvious difference between a statute stating the conditions upon which moneys 
shall be expended and one effective only upon assumption of a contractual obligation to submit 
to a regulation which otherwise could not be enforced.” (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 
U.S. 1, 73 (1936))). 
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E. The Absence of “Unconstitutional Conditions” Requirement 
Finally, the Dole majority imposed the rather unexceptional 
limitation that Congress cannot induce states to behave in a manner 
that violates the Constitution by conditioning receipt of federal funds 
upon such conduct.59 Numerous scholars have addressed the fourth 
limitation as a promising check on the power of Congress to intrude 
upon traditional state authority. Such proposals, however, even if 
instituted, are unlikely to circumscribe Congress’s potentially limitless 
authority under the Spending Clause. This Section addresses two 
prominent representative examples of such proposals to illustrate the 
difficulty of crafting any meaningful limit on federal Spending Clause 
power through the unconstitutional conditions requirement. 
Professor Albert Rosenthal, as part of a broader examination of 
the so-called unconstitutional conditions doctrine, considers the 
applicability of the doctrine to the protection of states’ rights. In a 
separate section of the article dealing with the protection of 
individual liberties, Rosenthal argues for a presumption that 
conditions upon federal spending may not be used to coerce conduct 
that violates one of the Constitution’s various provisions protecting 
civil liberties.60 He recognizes, however, that the Court has taken a 
significantly more protective approach when defending individual 
liberties against diminishment by coercive conditioning of federal 
funds than it has when defending state rights.61 
In the field of protection of states’ rights, Professor Rosenthal 
proposes that the assumption that states may adequately defend their 
interests through the political process is inapposite, given that any 
state may find it problematic to lobby both for receipt of federal 
funds and for removal of the conditions attached thereunto.62 Yet, 
Rosenthal does not propose a presumption against indirect Spending 
Clause regulation when direct regulation is otherwise unachievable, 
 
 59. Id. at 208. Importantly, the fourth limitation does not prevent Congress from 
promulgating legislation under the Spending Clause otherwise lacking support under other 
affirmative grants of constitutional power but rather prohibits its conditioning funds upon the 
states’ engaging in behavior otherwise barred by the Constitution, such as infliction of cruel and 
unusual punishment. Id. at 210–11. 
 60. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1152. 
 61. See id. at 1163 (“It is striking that in recent years the majority of the Court has almost 
never expressed in the civil liberties area what it has said with respect to interference with state 
autonomy: If you object to the condition, you have the simple alternative of not taking the 
money.”). 
 62. Id. at 1141. 
07__BULL.DOC 11/14/2006  8:41 AM 
2006] SPENDING CLAUSE 291 
as he does in the individual liberty area. Rather, he simply concludes 
that more evidence on the ability of states to control conditioning of 
funds through their representation in the federal government would 
be useful to courts in deciding such cases.63 Though Rosenthal 
provides powerful arguments for reexamining the degree of deference 
rendered to Congress in Spending Clause cases, he stops short of 
advocating a presumption against Spending Clause regulation that 
would otherwise fail under any other enumerated power of Congress. 
As such, Rosenthal appears implicitly to acknowledge that the 
principles of federalism vaguely implied by constitutional provisions 
such as the Tenth Amendment are not to be as vigilantly applied by 
the courts as provisions dealing with individual liberties. His implied 
acknowledgement rests on the recognition that Congress does not 
behave “unconstitutionally” and thereby violate the fourth Dole 
limitation every time it broadly applies constitutional grants of power 
and wields “police powers” of the type typically retained by states. 
Professor William Van Alstyne offers a modified version of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine as a solution to usurpation of 
state authority, suggesting that state judiciaries should invalidate 
acceptance of federal funds when the regulations attached to the 
funds would violate provisions of state constitutions.64 His proposed 
approach would potentially achieve the salubrious result of allowing 
states to provide more stringent constitutional protections for their 
citizens than they are otherwise minimally guaranteed under the U.S. 
Constitution.65 For instance, the legislature of California, a state in 
which the high court has interpreted the state constitution to 
guarantee access to abortion services in public as well as private 
facilities, could not legitimately accept federal funds conditioned 
upon states’ disallowing nontherapeutic abortions in public health 
facilities.66 
Unfortunately, Professor Van Alstyne’s brief article, though 
insightful, does not address the practicality of states’ refusing funds 
 
 63. Id. at 1142. 
 64. See William Van Alstyne, “Thirty Pieces of Silver” for the Rights of Your People: 
Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 303, 316 (1993) (addressing the right of state courts to invalidate acceptance of funds 
through a hypothetical example of a state’s compliance with regulations that violate an article of 
its constitution). 
 65. See id. at 320–21 (noting that Congress’s tendency to “flatten . . . out” differences 
amongst states may lead to a net reduction in the protection of civil liberties nationwide). 
 66. Id. at 317–18. 
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with attached conditions that violate state constitutions.67 Indeed, an 
exceedingly coercive attempt at Spending Clause regulation, such as 
conditioning all federal healthcare funds upon permitting public 
facilities to refuse to offer abortion services, could easily render it 
virtually impossible for a state to adhere to its desired level of 
protection of civil liberties. Under such circumstances, state voters 
would be likely to favor an amendment to the state constitution over 
losing the funding likely necessary to ensure survival of the state 
health care system, and the very conformity that Professor Van 
Alstyne fears would result.68 
In short, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine seemingly 
protects only against the violation of explicitly enumerated 
constitutional rights, such as those dealing with civil liberties like the 
right of free speech or the right to be free of cruel and unusual 
punishment, and thereby offers little protection against the expansion 
of federal authority into areas traditionally controlled by the states.69 
Further, though state courts may legitimately require a state whose 
constitution precludes engaging in the behavior contemplated by a 
condition placed upon federal funds to refuse such funds,70 Congress 
may still likely induce compliance, even if through amendment of the 
 
 67. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1959 (noting that Van Alstyne’s focus on the acceptance of 
federal funds rather than the offering of federal funds leads him to overlook the serious 
dilemma that states that reject funds in such a manner suffer a competitive disadvantage vis-à-
vis states that accept funds). 
 68. Id. at 1958–59. 
 69. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) (“[T]he ‘independent constitutional 
bar’ limitation on the spending power is not . . . a prohibition on the indirect achievement of 
objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly.”). The Tenth Amendment 
could theoretically provide an independent constitutional limitation on the ability of Congress 
to expand its powers into areas traditionally within the ambit of state authority via the Spending 
Clause. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 11, at 1923–24 (“The Constitution’s limitations, at least after 
Lopez, on Congress’s ability directly to regulate the states can be understood as Tenth 
Amendment rights that the states have against the federal government.”). However, modern 
case law has suggested that the Tenth Amendment merely comprises a truism and simply 
prevents expansion of grants of legislative power, such as the Commerce or Spending clauses, 
beyond the limitations inherent in the provisions themselves. See, e.g., New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 156–57 (1992) (“The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of 
Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we 
have discussed, is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the 
power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve 
power to the States.”). 
 70. Van Alstyne, supra note 64, at 316. 
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state constitution, through the imposition of highly coercive 
conditions upon the funds.71 
III.  DOLE’S ABSENCE OF “COERCION” REQUIREMENT AS AN 
ADEQUATE CHECK 
This Part commences with an examination of the historical 
evolution of the coercion standard, which first received complete, if 
somewhat obscure, articulation in the Dole decision. Subsequently, 
this Part acknowledges scholarly dissatisfaction with Dole’s vague 
absence of coercion standard. As a result of this dissatisfaction, 
numerous scholars have called for more meaningful limits on the 
federal spending power and have advanced proposals that largely 
focus, explicitly or implicitly, upon strengthening the vague 
interdiction against coercive conditions outlined in Dole. This Part 
relies primarily upon the work of Professor Lynn Baker as 
representative of the call for a clearer definition of the ambit of 
Congress’s spending power. Ultimately, this Part rejects Professor 
Baker’s proposed solution and the concept of a bright-line limit upon 
spending power generally. It concludes that the vague absence of 
coercion requirement developed in Spending Clause case law 
culminating in Dole provides a check upon Spending Clause power 
sufficient to deter congressional abuse while maintaining Congress’s 
ability to exercise effective control over the use of its funds as 
envisioned by the Hamiltonian standard adopted in United States v. 
Butler.72 
A. Coercion Standard Precedent 
Near the end of the Dole decision, almost as an afterthought, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted “that in some circumstances the 
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to 
pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”73 Though 
the Dole opinion did not precisely define when permissible persuasive 
conditions evolve into forbidden coercive ones, it summarily 
dismissed South Dakota’s claim that the conditioning of 5 percent of 
 
 71. Baker, supra note 11, at 1958–59. 
 72. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 73. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
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federal highway funds upon raising the minimum drinking age to 
twenty-one comprised coercion.74 
In this respect, Dole reflected the longstanding historical 
understanding that, as long as the state possesses the ultimate 
authority to accept federal funds with their associated conditions or to 
reject both, Congress does not interfere with traditional state 
authority even if it achieves indirectly through conditioning of funds 
what it could not achieve directly through legislation. The state, much 
as a party to a contract, makes the ultimate decision.75 Massachusetts 
v. Mellon76 reflected such an understanding by noting rather 
unceremoniously in dicta that a requirement appended to federal 
funds would likely prove constitutional inasmuch as “the statute 
imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the state is 
free to accept or reject.”77 Indeed, with the exception of Butler, which 
relied upon presently discredited tenets of the Tenth Amendment’s 
serving as an independent bar to Congress’s intrusion into areas of 
traditional state authority,78 the Court has never held unconstitutional 
a statute regulating states via conditions attached to federal funds.79 
Effectively, the corpus of modern Spending Clause legislation 
implies the concept that Congress’s irrefutable possession of the 
broad ability to deny states of its largesse in distributing federal funds 
necessarily entails the lesser ability to distribute those funds subject to 
the states’ adopting various conditions associated therewith. The 
rationale is similar to that articulated in Harris v. McRae,80 which held 
that Congress’s ability to refuse entirely to provide healthcare funds 
to indigent patients necessarily entails the ability to subsidize only 
certain procedures and explicitly to exclude even medically necessary 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1141 (noting the traditionally high degree of deference 
accorded to Congress in conditioning federal funds but arguing that such deference is largely 
misplaced). 
 76. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). This decision derives from the pre-New Deal era, when the Court 
had an exceedingly narrow view of the Commerce Clause. 
 77. Id. at 480. 
 78. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (“From the accepted doctrine that the 
United States is a government of delegated powers, it follows that those not expressly granted, 
or reasonably to be implied from such as are conferred, are reserved to the states or to the 
people. To forestall any suggestion to the contrary, the Tenth Amendment was adopted.”). 
 79. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1110. 
 80. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
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abortions from those subsidized procedures.81 In short, the greater 
power to withhold funding implies the lesser power to grant it only 
upon satisfaction of certain conditions. 
B. “Regulatory” and “Reimbursement” Spending Standard as 
Possible Limit on Spending Power 
Recently, scholars have questioned the autonomy-based notions 
upon which the courts have seemingly relied in almost universally 
upholding the constitutionality of conditions attached to federal 
funds.82 One such scholar, Professor Lynn Baker, articulately disputes 
the ability of states simply to decline federal funds when they find the 
attached conditions unpalatable. Specifically, she asserts that the 
federal government wields a monopoly power to tax the citizens of 
the various states to achieve its regulatory purposes.83 Given the 
virtually limitless ability of the federal government to tax and spend 
for the “general welfare,”84 it may unobjectionably tax state citizens to 
obtain sufficient funds to achieve its desired ends and then return 
those funds to the states subject to a bevy of conditions that achieve 
regulatory objectives otherwise beyond the constitutional ability of 
the federal government to achieve.85 Of course, the states’ 
concomitant ability to tax the citizens to achieve their desired 
regulatory objectives will thereby diminish, given that only a limited 
supply of tax dollars from which either government may draw exists.86 
More importantly, politically powerful states may exploit such a 
situation to ensure that their favored programs become the 
 
 81. See id. at 316 (“[I]t simply does not follow that a woman’s freedom of choice carries 
with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of 
protected choices.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 11, at 1938 (“[The] monopoly power that the federal 
government directly and indirectly wields over the states’ ability to raise revenue makes the 
states’ financial relationship with the federal government more closely analogous to that of 
welfare recipients than to that of public employees.”); Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1135 (“[T]he 
dependence of the state or local government upon federal funds may have become so great as to 
destroy the possibility of an effective choice.”). 
 83. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1937 (“[W]hen the federal government offers a state 
money subject to unattractive conditions, it is often offering funds that the state readily could 
have obtained without those conditions through direct taxation—if the federal government did 
not also have the power to tax income directly.” (emphases omitted)). 
 84. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.  
 85. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1937 (“[W]hen the federal government offers the states 
money, it can be understood as simply offering to return the states’ money to them, often with 
unattractive conditions attached.”). 
 86. See id. 
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nationwide standards, utilizing their control in Congress to condition 
receipt of federal funds upon other states’ adhering to their desired 
regulations87 and achieving the homogenization that scholars have 
feared.88 For instance, if the forty-nine states that do not recognize 
marriages amongst same-sex couples were to determine to coerce 
Massachusetts into similarly abandoning such a commitment to equal 
civil rights,89 they could presumably easily do so by conditioning the 
receipt of federal healthcare funds, the administration of which is at 
least marginally related to the existence or absence of unions amongst 
homosexual couples, upon outlawing same-sex marriage. 
Ultimately, Professor Baker concludes that such homogenization 
will diminish the aggregate social welfare insofar as the existence of a 
variety of “packages” of various rights allows any given American 
citizen to locate in the state that most closely approximates his or her 
desired level of protection and that such diversity increases net social 
welfare.90 To illustrate, were states that permit the death penalty for 
first-degree murder, which constitute a majority,91 to condition receipt 
of federal criminal enforcement funds upon receiving states’ allowing 
the imposition of the death penalty for first-degree murder, the net 
result would be negative. The net loss to death penalty opponents, 
who would no longer be able to locate in a state supporting their 
views, would exceed the net gain to death penalty advocates, who 
 
 87. See id. at 1940 (“The problem . . . lies in the ability of some states to harness the federal 
lawmaking power to oppress other states.”). 
 88. See Van Alstyne, supra note 64, at 320–21 (noting that Congress’s tendency to 
“flatten . . . out” differences amongst states may lead to a net reduction in the level of protection 
of civil liberties nationwide). 
 89. See Editorial, Sound of Shifting Ground, USA TODAY, Dec. 22, 2005, at 10A 
(“Massachusetts allows gay marriage. A handful of states accept or are considering allowing 
civil partnerships.”). 
 90. Baker, supra note 11, at 1950–51. 
 91. Thirty-eight states possess a death penalty statute, and twelve do not; the death penalty 
statutes of New York and Kansas were declared unconstitutional in 2004. Death Penalty 
Information Center, Facts about the Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
FactSheet.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2006). However, the U.S. Supreme Court recently found the 
challenged Kansas death penalty statute constitutional. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2529 
(2006). In People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004), the New York Court of Appeals held 
the state’s death penalty statute unconstitutional, id. at 361. The United States Supreme Court 
has not granted certiorari in the case, leaving thirty-seven states that permit capital punishment. 
See infra text accompanying note 92. 
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would not vastly benefit from the addition of thirteen states to the 
thirty-seven that already permit the death penalty.92 
Professor Baker acknowledges the countervailing dilemmas of 
states’ failing to adequately protect the rights of their citizens and the 
concomitant “races to the bottom” that may result when inadequate 
protection of citizens’ rights results in a competitive advantage for a 
state.93 She argues, however, that the minimum levels of civil rights 
guaranteed in the federal Constitution and the ability to amend the 
Constitution when such minimum levels of protection are no longer 
sufficient may guard against states’ abuse of their autonomy.94 
To thwart the ability of coalitions of states to homogenize state 
laws and constitutions by conditioning federal funding upon 
noncomplying states’ adopting policies desired by the coalition, 
Professor Baker proposes a presumption against conditions placed 
upon federal funds that regulate states in a manner that Congress 
could not achieve under an alternative constitutional grant of 
legislative authority.95 Congress may rebut the presumption by 
demonstrating that the spending at issue comprises “reimbursement” 
spending, which merely provides states with the capital necessary to 
finance projects, rather than “regulatory” spending, which provides 
financial incentives greater than those necessary to fund the proposed 
 
 92. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1951 (“The net result is likely to be a decrease in aggregate 
social welfare, since the loss in welfare to opponents of the death penalty is unlikely under these 
circumstances to yield a comparable gain in welfare for those who favor it.”). 
 93. See id. at 1952–53 (“[C]onditional offers of federal funds are not needed to rid states of 
their most pernicious laws: our federal and state constitutions unambiguously prohibit their 
enactment and enforcement. . . . [Further,] [s]hould our society reach a substantial consensus 
that interstate diversity in some area is no longer acceptable, we can always amend the 
Constitution to prohibit the practice(s) agreed to be immoral.”). The classic example is child 
labor: states without child labor laws may produce goods more cheaply than those who 
promulgate such statutes, given the relative inexpensiveness of such labor. Likely the most 
famous case addressing child labor, Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), noted that such 
disparities in levels of protection offered may result in “unfair competition” amongst the states 
but nonetheless invalidated national legislation aimed at preventing the shipment in interstate 
commerce of goods produced by child labor inasmuch as the legislation intruded upon 
traditional state police powers, id. at 273 (“There is no power vested in Congress to require the 
States to exercise their police power so as to prevent possible unfair competition.”). 
Undoubtedly, such regulation of inherently commercial activity would easily survive even the 
Lopez standard for Commerce Clause legislation today. See Nagel, supra note 2, at 648 (noting 
that inherently commercial activities with even weak ties to interstate commerce are easily 
subject to regulation under the Lopez standard). 
 94. See Baker, supra note 11, at 1952–53. 
 95. Id. at 1954. 
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projects.96 For example, Congress may legitimately reimburse states 
for their expenses in prosecuting individuals who knowingly possess 
firearms within a school zone, providing an incentive for states to 
enact such legislation, but may not condition receipt of a larger 
amount of federal education funds than is required to prosecute such 
offenders.97 
Professor Baker’s article likely provides the most complete 
recognition of the dilemmas underlying federal spending legislation to 
date, yet her proposed bright-line solution of dividing federal 
spending into constitutional reimbursement and unconstitutional 
regulation potentially creates more problems than it solves. Under 
the proposed system, as Professor Baker recognizes, states may still 
strongly encourage if not coerce uniformity of state laws by 
reimbursing themselves for programs they have already instituted, 
and thereby deplete limited tax revenues available for other programs 
in states that do not possess the programs for which reimbursement 
occurs.98 Of course, the proposed system nonetheless remains far less 
coercive than, for example, Congress’s attempts to condition all 
federal funds of a certain type upon enactment of a desired statute or 
compliance with a desired regulation. 
More importantly, Professor Baker’s system would largely 
ravage the ability of Congress to achieve various salubrious policies 
previously accomplished through the conditioning of federal funds, by 
allowing states to dissect spending statutes and then insist that they 
receive full funding less any costs associated with administering the 
various conditions. For example, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,99 the 
Supreme Court upheld the conditioning of federal public works funds 
upon the recipient state’s administering a system of race-based 
affirmative action in obtaining contractors to complete the 
construction contemplated by the funds.100 Under Baker’s system, 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1964–65. 
 98. See id. at 1970 (noting the problem of depleted funds but recognizing that every 
allocation of federal tax dollars results in such opportunity costs, given that some states would 
always prefer that the money be spent differently). 
 99. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
 100. Id. at 478. This Note cites Fullilove merely to provide an example of a variety of 
condition placed upon federal funds that cannot be easily analyzed via a typical cost-benefit 
analysis. However, though Fullilove has never been explicitly overruled, its effectively 
upholding an affirmative action system based upon a quota is almost certainly invalid in light of 
the Court’s more recent holding in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 
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states could insist that Congress determine the actual cost of 
administering such a system, which may be nearly impossible to 
define,101 and deduct that cost, if any, from the noncomplying states’ 
share of such funds. In short, Baker simply assumes that the cost of 
conditions may be defined economically, an assumption that may 
prove spurious for conditions that create more abstract costs and 
benefits. Hence, Baker’s proposal strictly limits Congress’s ability to 
ensure that states expend federal funds in a manner that achieves the 
goals Congress sought to accomplish in providing the funds. 
C. Abstractness as a Virtue: A Defense of the Dole 
Coercion Requirement 
Professor Baker’s bright-line solution potentially places excessive 
limits on the ability of Congress to ensure that its funds are expended 
in an acceptable manner, and perhaps erroneously assumes that the 
value of any condition may be assessed economically. Nonetheless, 
the limitations of Baker’s proposed standard do not necessarily imply 
that another bright-line solution may not preserve ample regulatory 
authority for Congress while providing more meaningful guidance to 
lower courts than does the vague absence of coercion requirement 
articulated in Dole. For instance, the Court could simply set an 
explicit percentage of funds, greater than the 5 percent of highway 
funds at issue in Dole, beyond which congressional conditioning of 
funds would automatically be deemed “coercive.” Though such 
explicit numerical standards are exceedingly rare,102 such a cutoff 
 
(1989) (“While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public discrimination 
in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs, this 
observation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota in the awarding of public 
contracts . . . .”). Nevertheless, affirmative action programs remain constitutional in appropriate 
contexts. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (upholding law school affirmative 
action program wherein race is considered as one factor amongst many). 
 101. Indeed, though administration of affirmative action programs undoubtedly creates 
costs for the states, many would suggest that the countervailing benefits produced, economically 
or otherwise, outweigh such costs, at least in the educational context. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 
at 328 (“Today, we hold that the [University of Michigan] Law School has a compelling interest 
in attaining a diverse student body.”). In fairness, such benefits should be subtracted from the 
costs created by the administration of the system, yet the economic value of such benefits is 
virtually impossible to determine. 
 102. Though admittedly unusual, such a bright-line standard based upon an exact 
mathematical figure is not unprecedented in the case law. For instance, in State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), the Supreme Court strongly 
suggested that an award of punitive damages that exceeded compensatory damages by a ratio of 
more than 10:1 would be declared unconstitutional as contrary to the Due Process Clause of the 
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would provide a clear directive to Congress of the extent of its 
Spending Clause power. 
Perhaps more realistically, the Court could articulate a more 
informative definition of the term “coercion.” Though she ultimately 
rejects a strengthened version of the coercion requirement as a 
legitimate check upon Spending Clause power,103 Professor Baker 
recognizes the potential classification of “coercion” into four distinct 
varieties of descending compulsion: (a) “‘no choice at all,’” (b) “‘no 
practical choice,’” (c) “‘no fair choice,’” and (d) “‘no rational 
choice.’”104 An actor possesses “no choice at all” when physically 
compelled to act, such as when someone forcibly commandeers 
another’s arm to strike a third person.105 The actor possesses “no 
practical choice” when compelled to act by extreme threat of force, 
such as when someone threatens to shoot another if he or she fails to 
engage in a certain action.106 Somewhat differently, the actor possesses 
“no fair choice” when offered an irresistible benefit for acting, such as 
when an affluent party offers to feed the starving children of another 
party in exchange for sexual favors.107 Finally, the actor possesses “no 
rational choice” when offered a benefit that a rational economic actor 
would accept, such as when an affluent party offers an impecunious 
party nonetheless living above subsistence level an exceedingly large 
sum of money for similar sexual favors.108 
Though the first two alternatives likely have no analogy in the 
Spending Clause context, the Court could potentially sort Spending 
Clause conditions into those offering “no fair choice” and those 
merely offering “no rational choice,” invalidating the former but 
permitting the latter. For instance, Chief Justice John Roberts 
recently characterized the position of law schools that oppose the 
Solomon Amendment’s requirement of equal access for military 
 
Fourteenth Amendment, see id. at 425 (“Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now 
established demonstrate, however, that, in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”). 
 103. See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should 
Abandon its Spending Doctrine, and how a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke it to do so, 78 
IND. L.J. 459, 521 (2003) (“Toughening the coercion prong is, we think, unlikely.”). 
 104. Id. at 520. 
 105. Id. at 518–19. 
 106. Id. (noting the similarity of this situation to the criminal law scenario of duress). 
 107. Id. at 519. 
 108. See id. at 520 (“[An actor] has ‘no rational choice’ [when] only one alternative is 
consistent with the minimum demands of instrumental rationality.”). 
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recruiters to on-campus recruitment outlets despite the military’s 
discrimination against homosexuals yet continue to accept federal 
funding for scholastic programs as disingenuous,109 given that the law 
schools could simply reject the funds. Indeed, the absence of federal 
funds would likely not prove fatal to most law programs, given the 
presence of state and private support, though a school’s loss of federal 
funding would certainly result in an overall decrease in quality of 
instruction and resultant comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis law 
schools that accept the same funds. In this light, most law schools 
effectively have “no rational choice” but to accept federal funding, 
given that a rational economic actor would sacrifice his or her moral 
convictions to receive substantial financial assistance. However, the 
same law schools likely possess a “fair choice,” given their capability 
of declining the funds and suffering the adverse impact of the 
consequent depletion of available resources. Applying such a rule, the 
Solomon Amendment would prove to comprise an acceptable 
application of the federal spending power, though the condition may 
devolve into one offering “no fair choice” if, for example, law school 
instruction in a particular region or state deteriorated so significantly 
that the court system of the region or state could no longer function 
properly. 
Unfortunately, such labels do not significantly facilitate the 
definition of the point at which acceptable persuasion devolves into 
impermissible compulsion, but rather recast the nomenclature. In 
short, simply defining acceptable conditions as offering “no rational 
choice” and unacceptable conditions as offering “no fair choice” 
provides no insight into the extent of coercion required for one to 
transition to the other. One could theoretically define conditions 
providing “no fair choice” as those that would require states to 
discontinue critical programs that cannot otherwise subsist absent 
federal funding if the states decline the funding. The state, however, 
constitutes an entity that can only act through its duly authorized 
agents, the elected representatives, and such representatives would 
face political fallout for declining federal funding necessary to 
perpetuate the critical state programs. The choice of any given 
representative between achieving a desired goal through refusal of 
 
 109. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and 
Institutional Rights, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152) (2006) (“What you’re saying is, ‘This is a 
message—[Laughter]—we believe in strongly, but we don’t believe in it, to the tune of $100 
million.’”). 
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crucial federal funds and preserving reasonable prospects for 
reelection, therefore, appears far more analogous to a decision posing 
“no rational choice.” 
In short, any conceivable bright-line solution is likely to suffer 
the inadequacies inherent to bright-line rules, either arbitrarily 
categorizing cases on the basis of some proposed mathematic limit110 
or providing some vague verbal classification of cases that provides 
little more guidance than a broad term such as “coercion.” 
Nevertheless, the law often imposes bright-line standards, 
despite their inherent drawbacks, so as to achieve certainty and 
consistency in lower court decisions. For more fundamental reasons, 
however, any bright-line solution in the Spending Clause context will 
almost certainly fail. The Constitution theoretically cannot 
simultaneously demand the limitless congressional power under the 
Spending Clause, envisioned by Hamilton and accepted in Butler, and 
the constricted view of congressional power demanded by federalism, 
yet the present constitutional jurisprudence appears to demand 
precisely that. Indeed, Spending Clause authority must provide 
powers beyond those enumerated in other constitutional grants of 
power such as the Commerce Clause, lest the Madisonian approach 
be effectively instituted in contravention of Butler.111 However, 
Supreme Court cases have repeatedly averred that Spending Clause 
authority is not unlimited.112 As such, any attempt to set an 
affirmative, bright-line limit on Congress’s spending power will be 
assailed as violating the Hamiltonian interpretation of the Spending 
Clause and Butler, yet the failure to impose any meaningful limit on 
the spending power will be assailed as a repudiation of the principles 
of federalism. 
Interestingly, following the issuance of the Lopez decision, 
Professor Robert Nagle noted a similar contradiction in the 
 
 110. Examples would include both Baker’s test, which limits the amount of funds 
conditioned to the sum necessary to reimburse states for certain programs, Baker, supra note 
11, at 1916, and the proposed test of an exact numerical limit upon the percentage of funds 
Congress could condition. 
 111. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (“[T]he power of Congress to 
authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of 
legislative power found in the Constitution.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1981) 
(“There are limits on the power of Congress to impose conditions on the States pursuant to its 
spending power.” (citations omitted)). 
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Commerce Clause,113 contending that the Court’s declaring the Gun-
Free School Zones Act unconstitutional merely constituted a step in 
the process of “successive validation,” wherein courts favor one side 
of an inherently two-sided problem while asserting the importance of 
the competing viewpoint.114 Hence, in Lopez, the Court finally 
fulfilled its repeated intimations in decisions upholding legislation 
passed under the Commerce Clause from 1937 to 1995 that that 
constitutional grant of legislative authority was subject to affirmative 
limits.115 Similarly, almost all modern Spending Clause decisions 
illustrate a similar pattern of upholding the conditioning of federal 
funds at issue but reminding Congress, at least implicitly, that an 
excessively coercive conditioning of funds will not pass constitutional 
muster. Though modern case law lacks any instance of the Court’s 
declaring a statute unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s 
regulatory power under the Spending Clause,116 Dole’s clear if 
somewhat terse interdiction against overly coercive conditions places 
Congress on notice that the Court117 will not tolerate naked attempts 
to coercively regulate states in a manner otherwise unachievable 
under other constitutional grants of legislative power.118 This is not 
dissimilar to the Rehnquist Court’s striking down two Commerce 
Clause statutes in Lopez and Morrison while leaving intact a massive 
body of statutory law enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, 
arguably simply providing a warning to Congress to behave with 
 
 113. See Nagel, supra note 2, at 649 (“[O]ur Constitution only authorizes certain 
enumerated powers for the national government, but also authorizes some enumerated powers 
that are broad enough to allow congressional control over any aspect of human affairs.”). 
 114. Id. at 652. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1126–27 (noting that only Butler, the holding of which 
relies upon presently discredited notions of the Tenth Amendment, declared a statute 
unconstitutional as exceeding Spending Clause authority). 
 117. The Court presently includes three of the five Justices who joined the Lopez majority 
and two traditionally conservative Justices who may show similar deference to states’ rights. 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist passed away on September 3, 2005, and was replaced in this 
position by conservative judge John Roberts when the Supreme Court began its annual term on 
October 3, 2005. Richard Willing, Justice O’Connor Remains Seated in the Swing Seat, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 28, 2005, at 4A. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor announced her retirement on July 
1, 2005. Id. President George W. Bush nominated conservative judge Samuel Alito to replace 
Justice O’Connor on October 31, 2005, Editorial, A New Nominee, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2005, 
at A24, and the Senate confirmed Judge Alito’s nomination on January 21, 2006, Maura 
Reynolds, A Stark Division in Vote for Alito, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A1. 
 118. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (cautioning that Congress may not 
constitutionally impose overly coercive conditions). 
07__BULL.DOC 11/14/2006  8:41 AM 
304 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:279 
caution in intruding upon states’ rights while providing no clear 
boundary that Congress may not cross. 
Furthermore, the Dole standard implicitly recognized that states 
typically possess sufficient political capital to oppose imposition of 
conditions that they consider objectionable.119 Professor Herbert 
Wechsler argued persuasively that, with respect to direct federal 
regulation, states exercise sufficient control through their influence 
upon the election of senators and members of congress and, less 
directly, the president, to effectively ensure that their interests are 
adequately defended at the national level.120 In the field of indirect 
Spending Clause legislation, one could theoretically argue that states 
may not as effectively oppose indirect regulation through 
conditioning of federal funds as they may oppose direct regulation 
through the Commerce Clause.121 Spending Clause decisions, 
however, have virtually unanimously asserted that Congress intrudes 
less thoroughly upon traditional domains of state power when 
regulating indirectly under the Spending Clause rather than directly 
under the Commerce Clause.122 Indeed, Professor Rosenthal’s 
contentions that states may find it difficult to oppose conditions while 
simultaneously supplicating for funding123 largely reinforces the 
prevailing assumption that regulation through conditioning of funds 
diminishes state autonomy to a lesser extent than does direct 
 
 119. See, e.g., id. at 210 (“The Court [in Oklahoma] found no violation of the State’s 
sovereignty because the State could, and did, adopt ‘the “simple expedient” of not yielding to 
what she urges is federal coercion.’” (quoting Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 
127, 143–44 (1947))). 
 120. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954) 
(“Far from a national authority that is expansionist by nature, the inherent tendency in our 
system is precisely the reverse, necessitating the widest support before intrusive measures of 
importance can receive significant consideration, reacting readily to opposition grounded in 
resistance within the states.”). Notably, the Supreme Court cited Wechsler’s article approvingly 
in the Garcia decision. See 469 U.S. 528, 550–51, 551 n.11 (1985) (“[T]he composition of the 
Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States from overreaching by 
Congress. The Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of the Executive and the 
Legislative Branches of the Federal Government.” (citing Wechsler, supra)). 
 121. See Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 1141 (“Whether or not there is enough political 
influence at the state and local government level to prevent the more intrusive direct threats to 
the autonomy of those governments, the same process may not work effectively to forestall 
similar interference through coercive conditions.”). 
 122. See id. (“[T]he actions of the courts and the comments of some scholars have 
consistently assumed that where direct regulation is valid, the constitutionality of similar 
interference with the states through conditional funding will be upheld a fortiori.”). 
 123. Id. 
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regulation, given that state legislators would almost certainly oppose 
conditions attached to a spending statute were the marginal cost of 
accepting the funds to exceed the marginal cost of rejecting them. In 
short, Wechsler’s insightful and widely accepted124 conclusions seem 
to apply at least as presciently to Spending Clause regulation as to 
other forms of regulation, suggesting that courts should not be overly 
eager to draw specific lines for when persuasion devolves into 
coercion insofar as the states already possess considerable political 
capital to oppose such coercion. 
IV.  EVIDENCE OF THE ADEQUACY OF EXISTING  
FEDERALIST CHECKS 
If the above arguments concerning the definite existence of 
inexact limits upon Congress’s ability to coerce state compliance with 
desired regulations prove correct, then Spending Clause statutes 
should reflect Congress’s implicit recognition that it must refrain from 
plying excessive coercion against states, lest the Court honor its 
promises made explicit in Dole and implied in earlier cases that it 
shall invalidate truly coercive legislation. 
Although Congress could theoretically condition the receipt of 
every dollar of federal funding within a specific category upon states’ 
compliance with every single condition concerning funds in that 
category, a review of litigated cases suggests that it almost never does 
so, reinforcing the contentions above.125 Instead, Congress typically 
(1) conditions only a percentage of major types of federal funding 
upon states’ compliance with desired regulations, (2) withholds a set 
sum of funding upon each instance of state noncompliance, or (3) 
defines funding types exceedingly narrowly and conditions receipt of 
that limited variety of funds upon compliance with regulations. 
Dole comprises the primary example of conditioning a 
percentage of a major category of funds upon states’ compliance with 
a desired regulation, and the percentage of funds it withheld is not 
unreasonable in light of state highway expenditures.126 
 
 124. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra Part III.C.  
 126. Dole involved withholding of 5 percent of federal highway funds. South Dakota v. 
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). In 2000, states spent 6.3 percent of their highway funds, 
including federal and state sources, on “Highway Law Enforcement & Safety.” U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Highway Funding and Expenditures, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ 
ohim/onh00/onh2p10.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2006). Obviously, far less than the entire 6.3 
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Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Service Commission127 comprises an 
example of withholding a set amount of funds upon each instance of 
state noncompliance. The state of Oklahoma suffered the loss of an 
amount equal to two years of salary of an official who impermissibly 
participated in political activities,128 a relatively minimal sum and an 
amount reasonably designed to incentivize compliance with the 
conditions placed upon the funds but not to penalize the state to an 
extent unjustified by the gravity of the transgressions of the officer at 
issue. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,129 though difficult to classify 
under the aforementioned framework, largely involved a similar 
system of persuading state compliance. In the system involved in the 
case, an employer contributing to a state unemployment 
compensation fund could vastly reduce his or her contributions to the 
analogous federal fund, providing an incentive for states to create 
unemployment compensation systems complying with various federal 
standards to capture such payments by employers.130 
Mellon involved the complete withholding of a very narrow 
category of federal funds, those designated for mitigating infant and 
maternal mortality during childbirth, upon the states’ failure to 
comply with various provisions attached to the funds.131 Similarly, 
Fullilove required states to institute a system of race-based 
affirmative action in order to receive federal funds for certain 
construction projects.132 In short, though the entire category of federal 
funds is withheld, the funds within the category are often relatively 
minimal and the condition at issue is absolutely sine qua non to 
ensure that the federal government achieves its objectives in 
distributing that limited category of funds. 
 
percent is dedicated to eradicating drunken driving by minors, but the figure suggests that 
roughly 5 percent of federal funds are spent on “highway safety” and that Dole’s permitting 
withholding of that amount, though in excess of what would be appropriate “reimbursement 
spending,” was not irrational. 
 127. 330 U.S. 127 (1947). 
 128. Id. at 133. 
 129. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
 130. Id. at 574 (“If the taxpayer has made contributions to an unemployment fund under a 
state law, he may credit such contributions against the federal tax, provided . . . that the state 
law shall have been certified to the Secretary of the Treasury by the Social Security Board as 
satisfying certain minimum criteria.”). 
 131. 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923). 
 132. 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (“The program conditions receipt of public works grants upon 
agreement by the state or local governmental grantee that at least 10% of the federal funds will 
be devoted to contracts with minority businesses . . . .”). 
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Further, when dealing with such narrow categories of funding, 
the Court is hesitant to enforce implied requirements of more 
extensive regulation than that necessary to achieve the limited aims 
contemplated by the narrow category of funds. For instance, in 
Pennhurst, the Court displayed an extreme hesitance to interpret a 
“bill of rights” for developmentally disabled persons, which would 
result in extensive compliance costs for the states, as mandatory 
inasmuch as Congress had only provided extremely limited funding to 
the states under a fairly narrow program for assisting persons with 
developmental disabilities.133 
Of course, not all statutes drawing upon the federal Spending 
Clause power easily fall into the aforementioned framework. For 
instance, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,134 
a statute that specifically raises the prospect of Congress’s 
circumventing limits upon its power through the use of the Spending 
Clause,135 simply requires all states who receive federal prison funds to 
comply with the terms of the Act.136 However, the concomitant 
 
 133. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (“The fact that 
Congress granted to Pennsylvania only $1.6 million in 1976, a sum woefully inadequate to meet 
the enormous financial burden of providing ‘appropriate’ treatment in the ‘least restrictive’ 
setting, confirms that Congress must have had a limited purpose in enacting [the ‘bill of rights’ 
provision].”). The holding of Pennhurst depends largely on the rationale of Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297 (1980), wherein the Court was exceedingly hesitant to interpret a statute to require 
states to fund medically necessary abortions when the state and federal government had shared 
the costs of funding such in the past, though the Court did note that Congress could perhaps 
impose such a requirement were it expressed clearly, see id. at 309 (“Since the Congress that 
enacted Title XIX did not intend a participating State to assume a unilateral funding obligation 
for any health service in an approved Medicaid plan, it follows that Title XIX does not require a 
participating State to include in its plan any services for which a subsequent Congress has 
withheld federal funding.”). 
 134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000). 
 135. In 1990, the Supreme Court held that laws of general applicability that only incidentally 
burden the free exercise of religion do not require analysis under strict scrutiny. Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005). Congress responded in 1993, effectively reinstituting strict 
scrutiny through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Id. The Court declared the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional in 1997, asserting that the Act superseded Congress’s 
remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act comprises the most recent utterance in the dialogue between the 
Court and Congress and applies strict scrutiny in a more limited set of circumstances, employing 
the Commerce Clause and Spending Clause rather than the Fourteenth Amendment as 
constitutional support. Id. at 2118–19. In Cutter, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act under the Establishment Clause, id. at 
2123, declining to consider whether the Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce or Spending 
Clause powers because such issues were not considered by the Court of Appeals, id. at 2120 n.7. 
 136. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1 (2000) (requiring all governments that receive federal 
financial assistance or that impose burdens affecting interstate commerce to refrain from 
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presence of Commerce Clause justification for the statute suggests 
that Congress could potentially regulate the states directly without 
engaging in conditioning of funds. Consequently, the statute provides 
little guidance as to whether Congress could legitimately condition 
the receipt of all federal prison funds upon state compliance with the 
Act. Indeed, so long as Congress retains relatively broad authority 
under the Commerce Clause137 and inasmuch as Congress may validly 
regulate states by conditioning any sum of funds so long as it could 
regulate the states directly under the Commerce Clause,138 one cannot 
confidently assess whether such statutes that impose what would 
otherwise appear to be a coercive conditioning of an excessive 
amount of federal funds would survive if solely relying upon Spending 
Clause justification. 
The review of relevant Spending Clause statutes, however, 
suggests that Congress often either declines to exercise its potential 
power to condition every dollar of major categories of funding upon 
state compliance with desired conditions, or invokes a separate 
potential constitutional power, such as the Commerce Clause, to 
independently justify the legislation. Whether such forbearance arises 
from fear of provoking the Court into invalidating an overly coercive 
statute or from the success of state representatives in adequately 
defending the interests of their respective states in the national 
lawmaking forum, Congress seldom withholds such massive amounts 
of funds that autonomous state acceptance becomes a chimera. 
Rather, Congress typically closely tailors the penalty for 
noncompliance to provide a strong incentive for compliance but 
preserve meaningful choice. 
 
imposing any substantial burden upon the free exercise of religion of institutionalized persons 
or from imposing such a burden through land use regulations unless in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest). 
 137. A very recent reassertion of the broad authority of Congress to regulate any activity 
that may rationally be described as having effects on interstate commerce occurred in Gonzales 
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), wherein the Court upheld the ability of the federal government to 
regulate the growing of medical marijuana for personal use under the Commerce Clause insofar 
as production of such a fungible commodity altered supply and demand in the illegal interstate 
channels in which it typically traded, id. at 2206–07. 
 138. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980) (“The reach of the Spending Power, 
within its sphere, is at least as broad as the regulatory powers of Congress. If, pursuant to its 
regulatory powers, Congress could have achieved the objectives of the [program at issue], then 
it may do so under the Spending Power.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
When considering the present contour of Spending Clause 
jurisprudence, the classic adage “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” seems to 
offer the wisest path to follow. The Spending Clause has the potential 
to allow Congress to completely supplant state governments in the 
exercise of their core police powers, but the principles of federalism 
dictate that the courts preserve some limits. The limits articulated in 
Dole are admittedly vague and provide little clarity to lower courts in 
considering the constitutionality of conditions attached to federal 
funds. Dole’s four enumerated limits upon Spending Clause authority 
appear to consist more of rhetoric than substance. The Court only 
noted the fifth limitation on coercion in passing, and never fully 
articulated its precise dimensions. The Court’s attempts to define 
“coercive” and “non-coercive” in the Spending Clause context prove 
as arbitrary and unsatisfying as attempts to define “commercial” and 
“non-commercial” in the Commerce Clause context. Yet, despite its 
flaws, Dole may provide as much clarity as is possible in an area in 
which precise lines are difficult if not impossible to draw. The sheer 
prospect that the Court might break the cycle of successive validation 
and strike down a statute as exceeding the spending power induces 
congressional caution in the area. The mere shadow of potential 
judicial invalidation of a Spending Clause statute provides an 
amorphous but real check on Congress’s power beyond that inherent 
in the political process. This suggests that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
opinion in Dole, far from being inconsistent with federalist principles, 
actually advanced them. Indeed, Rehnquist’s opinion in Dole 
established a framework for Spending Clause legislation similar to 
that adopted for Commerce Clause legislation, one subject to vague 
limits that nonetheless place Congress on notice of the Court’s 
willingness to preserve a continued role for state governments. 
